AI compliance in WORKSPACE.PM
Where WORKSPACE.PM uses artificial intelligence, which data is processed, how you control it and where its limits are. Openly documented for data protection, IT security, works councils and internal audit.
Version 1.0 · As of 2026-10-05 · Product version 2.0.10AI compliance documentation
The complete package as a working basis for your review: reference documentation, information paper, policy template, review and approval checklist, works agreement template, works council briefing and employee privacy notice template, plus nine appendices from the tool catalogue to the mapping to ISO/IEC 42001 and 27001.
The documentation and templates are available in German. An English version is available on request.
Contents
01
What this is about
This page summarises how WORKSPACE.PM uses artificial intelligence. It is written for everyone who reviews or approves its use: data protection officers, IT security, works councils, internal audit and auditors. The full version with all details, templates and appendices is available as a PDF above.
We also state what WORKSPACE.PM cannot do today. For your assessment that matters just as much as the controls that exist.
Status and binding effect
02
At a glance
| Topic | Status |
|---|---|
| Default | AI is off. No preset provider, no bundled access key. |
| AI providers | Your choice: Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek, Mistral or an OpenAI-compatible endpoint. |
| Operation without an external provider | Possible, with a locally hosted model (e.g. Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio, llama.cpp). |
| Role of the AI provider | Not a subprocessor of AMNAU GmbH; you conclude your own contract with it. |
| Training | WORKSPACE.PM trains no models and does not pass customer data on for this purpose. |
| What the AI can see | At most the permissions of the signed-in person; tenant separation at database level. |
| Changes by the assistant | Every write action is confirmed individually and checked server-side. |
| Read-only | Tenant-wide for the assistant, per role for MCP. |
| Tools | 255 tools: 95 read, 126 write, 34 delete. |
| Audit trail | Source interface, assistant, MCP, API, system or mobile app, wherever the function writes an entry. |
| Conversations | Readable only by the person who held them, not by administrators either. No automatic retention period. |
| Access keys | Stored encrypted with AES-256-GCM, never sent to the browser. |
| EU AI Act | In our assessment not a high-risk system; transparency obligation under Art. 50(1) implemented. |
| Works council | We assume co-determination applies under Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG. |
03
AI is switched off until you switch it on
WORKSPACE.PM ships without a preset AI provider and without a bundled access key. Without explicit setup by your administration, no AI processing takes place and WORKSPACE.PM passes no data to a model.
The MCP interface, through which external AI applications connect, has its own switch. It does not call a model itself and does not require an AI configuration. In new tenants it is switched off; tenants that existed before this default was introduced kept it switched on. There, it is worth checking the switch.
WORKSPACE.PM is fully usable without AI. There is no step that cannot be done without it.
04
Where AI appears in the product
Except for the MCP interface, all features require a configured AI setup and are controlled through the generativeAi permission. They run within the signed-in person's permissions and when that person triggers them; the only exception is the project summary. There is no switch per feature; the features in Microsoft Teams are off by default.
| Feature | Trigger | What is sent to the model | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chat assistant Ace | "Chat" page | The person's name, role and response language, their input, the conversation so far, results of tool calls | Conversation is stored, readable only by this person |
| Chat in the Teams bot | Message to the bot in Microsoft Teams; off by default | as in the chat; messages also pass through Microsoft Teams | Conversation is stored |
| Project creation from documents | "New project" → "Create with AI" | Text of the uploaded PDF, at most 120,000 characters; not the file itself | Suggestions; nothing is saved until the project is created |
| Text suggestions for project fields | Creation assistant, per field (description, goals, benefits, motivation) | Project description and existing details | Suggestion, adopted by the person |
| Structure and milestones | Creation assistant, project structure | Project context | Suggestion for phases, work packages and milestones |
| Risks and measures | Risks page, risk detail window, creation assistant | Project context, for measures the risk including its assessment | Suggestion; assessments are estimates by the model |
| Wiki content and timeline post | Creation assistant | Project context | Suggestion |
| Analysis of meeting minutes | Meeting → "Analyse minutes" | Text of the minutes; regularly contains employee names | Suggestion for results, decisions and tasks |
| Minutes draft from a Teams transcript | On request at the meeting; off by default | Transcript with contributions attributed by name | Draft; enters the data only after review and adoption |
| Project summary | Automatically when the project overview is opened and none exists or it is older than three days; also "Regenerate" | Project profile, master data and activity of the last 14 days | Stored without an adoption step, visible to everyone with read access to the project |
| Widget agent | Administration → custom widgets | Widget code and data samples within the administrator's permissions | Code suggestion, adopted manually; the conversation is not stored |
| External AI applications (MCP) | The person's external application; separate switch, off in new tenants | Business data within the person's permissions, to the application and, where applicable, its AI provider | Changes only with the integrationMcp: edit level, without confirmation in WORKSPACE.PM |
Not an AI feature: search, reports, analytics, dashboards, workflows and notifications work rule-based on the stored data, without a language model. Document generation does not call a model either.
05
Operating modes and what they mean for data protection
| Operating mode | Who runs the model | Does data leave your organisation? |
|---|---|---|
| Your own provider (BYOK) | Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek or Mistral, with your own access | Yes, to the provider you chose |
| Local model | You, on your own hardware, for example with Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio or llama.cpp | In the self-hosted edition, no. In the SaaS edition only to your own, publicly reachable model server |
With your own provider, you choose the AI provider yourself and conclude your own agreement with them. Our data processing agreement does not cover this transfer; the AI provider is not a subprocessor of AMNAU GmbH. If the provider is outside the EU, this is a third-country transfer that you need to safeguard. For Anthropic, OpenAI and Mistral you set the processing region; DeepSeek's interface is operated in China.
With a locally hosted model, questions about data processing agreements, third countries and training at the provider do not arise. For the assistant's tools the model needs reliable function calling; otherwise the assistant works as a plain chat without tools.
WORKSPACE.PM itself trains no models and does not pass customer data on for this purpose. Whether a chosen provider uses transmitted content for its own training depends on its terms and your plan.
Who is responsible for what under data protection law
| Operating mode | Controller | Processor |
|---|---|---|
| Self-hosted, local model | You as the customer | none, no third party involved |
| Self-hosted, your own provider | You as the customer | the AI provider you commissioned |
| SaaS, your own provider | You as the customer | AMNAU GmbH for the application; you commission the AI provider separately |
06
What the AI can see and where its boundary is
The AI always works on behalf of the signed-in person and sees at most what that person may see in the interface. Every tool call, in the assistant as well as via MCP, runs through the same tenant separation and permission check as a click in the interface. Tenant separation is enforced at database level.
For your assessment this means: what counts is the scope of permissions of the people allowed to use AI. Broad permissions give the AI broad access. So do not connect accounts with administration rights to the assistant or to MCP.
What is sent to the model
- The person's input, and in the chat also the conversation so far
- In the chat the person's first name, name and role as well as the response language; not the email address, personnel number or manager
- Results of tool calls, limited by the person's permissions
- When creating a project from a PDF only its text, at most 120,000 characters; the file itself never leaves the browser
- When analysing meeting minutes their text, which regularly contains employee names
What is not sent to the model
- Uploaded files themselves, only the text read in the browser
- Credentials, passwords and session keys
- Data of other tenants and data outside the person's permissions
- Consumption data and the audit trail as such; the project summary only receives the status and phase changes of the last 14 days
07
The five most important controls
Permission boundary
The AI only sees what the signed-in person may see. Every tool call runs under their identity.
Mandatory confirmation in the assistant
Every write action of the assistant is shown beforehand with all values and confirmed individually. The server checks the confirmation; a forged confirmation does not lead to execution.
Read-only
The assistant can be set to read-only tenant-wide, MCP per role and independently of other permissions. Deletion can be blocked separately in both channels.
Evidence in the audit trail
Changes triggered by AI carry the source assistant or MCP, wherever the function concerned writes an audit entry.
Consumption limit
Monthly token budget per person, consumption traceable per person, optionally with a cost estimate. A retention period can be set for consumption data.
08
External AI applications via MCP
Through the open standard MCP (Model Context Protocol), your employees connect external AI applications such as Claude, ChatGPT or Microsoft Copilot to WORKSPACE.PM. Each person signs in individually instead of through a shared account; their permissions apply, plus a separate permission level for MCP. Your administration sees all connections and can revoke individual people's access at any time.
Two settings to make deliberately
- 1Set MCP to read access. With the permission level integrationMcp: view every write attempt is rejected, even for people who may change everything in the interface. In new tenants the PMO and Team roles can only read and the Admin role can write; in older tenants all built-in roles have write access. Write actions via MCP are not confirmed by WORKSPACE.PM but, depending on its settings, by the external application.
- 2Do not connect accounts with administration rights. For such accounts the upper limit would be "everything", which effectively cancels out the protection of the permission model.
What the external application does with retrieved data is outside WORKSPACE.PM; your agreement with its vendor applies. Which applications are allowed is something you regulate organisationally; there is currently no technical allowlist.
09
What to decide before you start
- 1Provider or local model? For high protection needs: local. For Anthropic, OpenAI and Mistral you also set the processing region.
- 2Who may use AI? A dedicated role with narrow permissions instead of broad existing roles.
- 3Read only or write as well? Our recommendation: start with read access.
- 4Which external AI applications are allowed? You regulate this organisationally. Until the target configuration is in place, MCP is best left switched off.
- 5How long are chat histories and consumption data kept? For consumption data you set the period; for chat histories you currently define it organisationally.
- 6Explicitly rule out employee-related analyses.
- 7Involve the works council before approval. We assume co-determination applies.
Recommended baseline for highly regulated environments
| Setting | Recommendation | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| AI provider | local model; otherwise a provider with EU location and data processing agreement | avoids the third-country question |
| Read-only mode of the assistant | active at first | introduce the assistant as a reference tool |
| Deletion (assistant and MCP) | blocked unless explicitly needed | deleting actions cannot be undone via the AI |
| integrationMcp in standard roles | view | read access as the default |
| Write access | dedicated role, named group, time-limited | principle of least privilege |
| Accounts with administration rights | do not connect them to AI channels | would otherwise cancel out the permission model |
| Permissions for time tracking and user lists | keep narrow for AI users | limits employee-related analyses |
| Maximum steps per answer | 5 to 8 | limits the scope of an answer |
| Monthly token limit per person | set | cap on cost and misuse |
| Cost rates | entered | evidence for the business department |
| Audit trail | review regularly by source | ongoing control |
| Conversations | define a deletion rule organisationally | as long as no technical retention period exists |
| MCP | switched off until the target configuration is in place | deliberate approval instead of silent availability |
The review and approval checklist in the documentation lists these points for ticking off; the policy template contains matching wording.
10
Evidence for auditors
What an auditor can verify directly in WORKSPACE.PM, without having to rely on assurances:
| Question | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Is AI active, and with which provider? | AI configuration in the administration |
| Who may use AI? | Role overview with the generativeAi and integrationMcp permissions |
| Can the AI write? | "Allow changes" switch (assistant); integrationMcp level per role (MCP) |
| Which changes come from AI? | Audit trail with filter by source |
| Who uses how much? | Consumption report per person and month |
| Which instructions does the model receive? | System prompts verbatim in the administration; also Appendix C of the documentation |
| Which tools are available? | Tool catalogue in Appendix B, generated from the source code with every release |
| Is MCP active? | Administration → Integrations → WORKSPACE.PM MCP |
| Who is connected via MCP? | MCP overview: person, status, requests, last use, most recently used application |
11
Building blocks for the data protection impact assessment
The documentation provides pre-written building blocks for your data protection impact assessment: description of the processing, necessity and proportionality, and risks with measures. Only you can assess your specific purpose of use.
Indicators for proportionality: the features are optional and can be switched off, the scope of data is limited by the person's permissions, and operation without transfer to third parties is possible with a local model. Less intrusive alternatives are restricting to read access and a narrow group of users.
| Risk for data subjects | Measure | Residual risk |
|---|---|---|
| Transfer of employee data to a provider | local model; otherwise data processing agreement and provider review | depends on the provider |
| Analysis of performance and behaviour | organisational exclusion, narrow permissions, co-determination | remains, as technically possible |
| Incorrect information from the model | suggestion character, duty to review, confirmation before changes | low if observed |
| Unintended change to data (assistant) | mandatory confirmation with server-side check, audit trail with source | low |
| Confidential content in stored conversations | access only by the person who held them; deletion by them | elevated as long as there is no automatic retention period |
| Leakage via an external AI application (MCP) | read access as the baseline, organisational approval of applications | depends on the application |
| Injected instructions | mandatory confirmation, limited set of tools, fixed rule in the system prompt, permission boundary, read access via MCP | see known limits |
| AI-generated content not recognisable | suggestion character during generation; audit trail for assistant actions | open |
Once the recommended baseline and the organisational rules are in place, we consider the residual risk manageable. Three points require an explicit decision by you: retention of conversations, exclusion of employee-related analyses and the handling of external AI applications via MCP.
What you add
- Purpose of use and affected areas
- Group of people with AI permission
- Chosen AI provider and legal basis for the transfer
- Retention rule
- Interaction with other systems
- Outcome of the works council involvement
12
Known limits
The following points describe limits of the current state. Take them into account in your assessment and in your organisational measures. We track them as open points in the documentation and record every change.
Analysis of employee data
WORKSPACE.PM does not assess performance and analyses nothing automatically. But anyone allowed to query tasks, time tracking and the user list can ask a language model to draw conclusions about individuals. You should explicitly rule out such analyses in your policy.
Retention of chat histories
People delete their own histories; your administration can delete a person's histories as a whole without reading them. There is no automatic retention period yet.
Labelling of AI-generated content
For actions of the assistant the audit trail shows the source. Accepted text suggestions are stored as normal records and are not marked as AI-generated in the data.
Gaps in the audit trail
Not every function writes an audit entry, currently for example moving task cards, checklists and timeline posts. This then also applies to changes made via AI.
Allowed external AI applications
MCP can be switched off tenant-wide or controlled per role. Allowing or blocking individual applications technically is currently not possible.
Stored conversations after permission changes
Data retrieved once stays in the history and is sent to the model again in follow-up questions, even if the person may no longer see it. When permissions are withdrawn, it is advisable to have the conversations deleted.
Injected instructions
In the assistant, an instruction hidden in content cannot change anything without a visible, confirmed action. If an application connected via MCP has its own internet or file access, such an instruction can direct data there. Read access and a rule for allowed applications limit this.
Many confirmations for bulk creation
Because the assistant asks for confirmation of each write action, creating many objects in the chat leads to many confirmations. For a complete project, creating the project from a document is the intended route: review once, save once.
13
Classification under the EU AI Act and works constitution law
In our assessment, without legal advice: with its AI features WORKSPACE.PM is an AI system, AMNAU GmbH is its provider and your organisation is usually the deployer. The models come from third parties or are run by you.
- Not a high-risk system: WORKSPACE.PM is not intended for decisions about employees or for assessing performance and behaviour, and contains no such function.
- No prohibited practices: no emotion recognition, no biometric categorisation, no social scoring.
- Art. 50(1): the assistant is labelled as AI, and running AI operations are shown as such.
- Art. 50(2): generated content is not marked in a machine-readable way; we rely on the exception in the Commission guidelines for internal business applications. If you pass AI content on externally, we recommend labelling it.
- Art. 4 AI literacy: training your users is your responsibility as the deployer; the policy template covers the key points.
- No automated decisions under Art. 22 GDPR: suggestions are adopted by a human.
Classification per feature
| Feature | Classification |
|---|---|
| Chat assistant | not a high-risk system; transparency obligation under Art. 50(1), the interaction with an AI is recognisable |
| Generating features (texts, risks, measures, wiki) | not a high-risk system; longer texts generally fall under Art. 50(2), exception for internal business applications; short titles not covered |
| Project summary | not a high-risk system; Art. 50(2) with exception for internal business applications; labelled as an AI summary in the interface |
| Analysis of minutes, including from Teams transcripts | not a high-risk system; Art. 50(2) with exception for internal business applications; adopted by the person |
| Widget agent | not a high-risk system; generates program code, which under the Commission guidelines is not covered by Art. 50(2) |
| MCP interface | not an AI feature of its own; the model is integrated by the external application |
Because the available tools are objectively suitable for analysing behaviour or performance, we assume co-determination applies under Section 87(1) no. 6 of the German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG). A template for informing the works council under Section 80(2) BetrVG is included, and a works agreement template for the agreement itself.
14
Mapping to ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001
For customers with a management system under ISO/IEC 42001 or ISO/IEC 27001, the documentation maps the AI features to the clauses of the standards. It shows which product property contributes to a control; a control is never fulfilled by the product alone, but in your management system. No certification of the product or of AMNAU GmbH is claimed.
ISO/IEC 42001 (AI management system)
| Clause | Topic | Contribution of the product |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.2 | AI risk assessment | building blocks for the assessment per feature |
| 6.1.4, A.5 | AI system impact assessment | pre-written building blocks for the data protection impact assessment |
| 7.2 | Competence | guidance on training content, policy template with a summary for employees |
| 8.1 | Operational planning and control | recommended target configuration, review and approval checklist |
| A.2 | Policies related to AI | policy template |
| A.3 | Roles and responsibilities | role and permission model per AI channel |
| A.6 | AI system life cycle | procedure for model changes and deprecation, appendices maintained per release |
| A.7 | Data for AI systems | transmitted data categories and their limits |
| A.9 | Responsible use | exclusion of employee-related analyses, duty to review before adoption |
| A.10 | Third-party relationships | allocation of roles per operating mode, provider profiles |
ISO/IEC 27001, Annex A
| Clause | Topic | Contribution of the product |
|---|---|---|
| 5.15 | Access control | the AI inherits the person's permissions; separate level for MCP |
| 5.19 to 5.22 | Supplier relationships | allocation of roles per operating mode, provider review, profiles |
| 5.23 | Information security for cloud services | operating modes, location question, local model as an alternative |
| 5.33 | Protection of records | audit trail with source, consumption log |
| 5.34 | Privacy and protection of personal data | description of the processed data and data subject rights |
| 8.2 | Privileged access rights | recommendation not to connect accounts with administration rights to AI channels |
| 8.3 | Information access restriction | permission boundary of the AI, read-only for assistant and MCP |
| 8.12 | Data leakage prevention | limits of transmission, leakage risk via external AI applications |
| 8.15 | Logging | audit trail with source, wherever the function writes an entry |
| 8.16 | Monitoring activities | review by source, consumption, MCP connections |
| 8.24 | Use of cryptography | access keys encrypted with AES-256-GCM |
| 8.31 | Separation of environments | tenant separation at database level, also for the AI channels |
The full mapping, including the articles of the GDPR, the EU AI Act and the German Works Constitution Act, is in Appendix H of the documentation.
15
The document package
The documentation is built as a working basis for your review: for audits, data protection impact assessments, security questionnaires and works council involvement. The templates are also available as editable Word files.
| Document | Content | Access |
|---|---|---|
| Reference documentation | Complete technical and data protection description with building blocks for the data protection impact assessment | PDF from p. 5 |
| Information paper | Four-page summary for decision-makers | PDF from p. 34 |
| Policy template | Template for your internal rules on using AI and MCP | Word template |
| Review and approval checklist | Points to tick off for IT security and data protection before approval | PDF from p. 42 |
| Works agreement template | Building blocks for the agreement with the works council, with annexes on the technical setup | Word template |
| Works council briefing | Template for briefing the works council before negotiations | Word template |
| Employee privacy notice template | Information for employees under Art. 13 GDPR | Word template |
| Appendices A to I | Feature index, catalogue of the 255 tools, wording of the system prompts, data model, provider profiles, configuration parameters, answers for security questionnaires, mapping to standards and laws, change log | PDF from p. 68 |
16
Answers for security questionnaires
The answers from Appendix G of the documentation, for use in security questionnaires and supplier assessments. In the PDF, every answer references the relevant section.
General
Does WORKSPACE.PM use artificial intelligence?
Yes, as an optional feature. Without setup by your administration no AI processing takes place; there is no preset provider and no bundled access key. The MCP interface for external AI applications has its own switch and is switched off in new tenants.
Which AI providers are used?
You choose: Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek, Mistral or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, including locally hosted ones, for example with Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio or llama.cpp.
Can we switch off the AI features completely?
Yes. Tenant-wide by not setting up the AI configuration or deactivating it, and per role through the generativeAi permission. The "AI assistant" feature flag under Administration → Modules has the same effect. These switches do not cover the MCP interface; it is switched off separately, tenant-wide or per role through integrationMcp.
Is WORKSPACE.PM fully usable without AI?
Yes. There is no step that cannot be done without AI. If the AI provider fails, only the AI features are affected; all other functions remain unaffected.
Can we use the AI with our own, locally hosted model?
Yes. Any endpoint with an OpenAI-compatible interface is supported, for example Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio or llama.cpp. The call is made from the WORKSPACE.PM server; no internet access is required for it. In the self-hosted edition neither content nor personal data then leave your infrastructure; in the SaaS edition the model server must be publicly reachable. For tool calls the model needs reliable function calling, otherwise the assistant works as a plain chat.
Are there AI features in Microsoft Teams?
Only if the Teams integration is set up, and there they are off by default: a chat with the assistant in the Teams bot and a minutes draft from the transcript of a Teams meeting, which is adopted only after review. Both use the AI configuration and permissions of WORKSPACE.PM; messages also pass through Microsoft Teams.
Data processing
Which data is sent to the model?
Depending on the feature: the person's input; in the chat also first name, name, role and response language as well as the conversation so far; results of tool calls; for the generating features project content and the text of uploaded documents or meeting minutes; for the project summary master data and activities of the last 14 days. The scope of tool results follows from the conversation and is limited by the person's permissions. Email address, personnel number and manager are not part of the system prompt.
Can the AI access data a person is not allowed to see?
No. Every tool call runs under the signed-in person's identity through the same tenant separation and permission check as the interface; tenant separation is enforced at database level. Note: stored conversations are not filtered after a permission change; previously retrieved data remains in the history. After permissions are withdrawn, your administration can delete the person's conversations.
Are uploaded files transferred to the AI provider?
Not the file itself, but its text. When creating a project from documents, the browser reads the text from the PDF; only this text, at most 120,000 characters, goes to the model via the WORKSPACE.PM server. There is no text recognition for scans; a scanned document is rejected with a notice.
Is our data used to train models?
Not by us: WORKSPACE.PM trains no models and does not pass customer data on for this purpose. Whether the chosen AI provider uses transmitted content for its own training depends on its terms and your plan. For Mistral the default of the training switch is not published; check the "Anonymous improvement data" switch in your account. With a local model the question does not arise.
Where is data stored that is created in connection with AI?
In the application's database: in the SaaS edition in data centres of Hetzner Online GmbH in Germany, in the self-hosted edition at the location of your installation. Stored are the assistant's conversations, consumption data without content, the AI configuration with an encrypted access key and customised system prompts. Adopted suggestions are stored as normal business data.
How long is this data kept?
For consumption data a retention period in months can be set (default: never). For conversations there is currently no automatic retention period: people delete their own conversations, and your administration can delete a person's conversations as a whole without reading them. If a person is deleted, their conversations and consumption data are removed; the audit trail is kept. Where a retention period is required, you currently define it organisationally.
Can administrators read employees' conversations?
No. In the application, conversations are only accessible to the person who held them; administrators have no access either. They see consumption per person as figures, not the content.
Access protection and control
Can the AI change data?
Yes, if write access is granted. In the built-in assistant every change is shown beforehand with all values and must be confirmed individually; the server checks the confirmation against its own single-use record. Via MCP, confirmation is not handled by WORKSPACE.PM but, where applicable, by the external application; with the integrationMcp: view level MCP stays read-only. In both channels the person's business permissions apply.
Can we restrict the AI to read access?
Yes. The built-in assistant tenant-wide through the "Allow changes" switch; write and delete tools are then not offered to the model at all. The MCP interface per role through the integrationMcp: view level, which works independently of other permissions. In new tenants the PMO and Team roles already have this level; in older tenants you set it actively.
Can we block specific actions, such as deletions, for the AI?
Yes, deletion. Delete tools can be blocked separately while creating and changing remain allowed: in the assistant through "Allow deletion", for MCP through "Allow delete tools". In newly created configurations both switches are off by default; the server rejects blocked deletions.
How are access keys to AI providers protected?
They are stored encrypted with AES-256-GCM; the decryption key is held in the runtime environment, not in the database. Stored access keys are never sent to the browser, not to administrators either; the interface only shows whether a key is stored.
How is access to internal systems via the endpoint configuration prevented?
Calls to a configured endpoint pass through a protection layer that resolves the target address, pins it and checks it again after redirects. In the SaaS edition private and internal addresses are rejected; in the self-hosted edition they are allowed, because your own model runs there.
Is resource consumption limited?
Yes: at most 8 model calls per answer (adjustable from 1 to 20), a time limit of 180 seconds per answer (adjustable from 10 to 900), a maximum answer length and a monthly token budget per person. The budget is unlimited by default; we recommend setting it. People with generativeAi: edit may exceed it.
Evidence
Can we trace which changes came from AI?
Yes, wherever the function concerned writes an audit entry. Every entry in the audit trail carries a source such as interface, assistant or MCP, for MCP with the name the application states itself. Some functions, such as moving task cards, currently write no entry. Adopted suggestions of the generating features are not recognisable as AI-generated in the audit trail.
Is consumption per person traceable?
Yes. For every completed operation the person, the model and the tokens used are recorded, without content. Your administration evaluates this per person and month, with your own provider optionally with a cost estimate; each person sees their own figures. MCP calls do not appear here, because WORKSPACE.PM does not call a model for them.
Can we see which instructions the model receives?
Yes. All built-in system prompts can be viewed verbatim in the administration, for all AI features; the wording of the 21 system prompts is also printed in Appendix C of the documentation. If your tenant customises system prompts, a preview shows the effective text, and every change is logged.
Which functions are available to the AI?
In the assistant and via MCP, 255 tools: 95 read, 126 write and 34 delete tools. Appendix B of the documentation lists them in full with description and required permission. In the assistant, write tools are limited to at most eight per answer.
External AI applications (MCP)
What is MCP, and is it active by default?
MCP (Model Context Protocol) is an open standard through which external AI applications use the tools of WORKSPACE.PM. Sign-in is per person via OAuth with a consent page. In new tenants MCP is switched off; tenants that existed before this default kept it switched on. Once switched on, MCP can be used without an AI configuration.
Can we define which external applications are allowed?
Organisationally yes, technically not at present. MCP can be switched off tenant-wide, controlled per role or restricted to read access. There is no technical allowlist: under the open standard, any application can register itself and state its own name; the person confirms the connection on the consent page. The policy template contains wording for approving applications.
Can we see who is connected via MCP?
Yes. The MCP overview in the administration shows per person active sessions, number of requests, last use, most recently used application and token validity. The counters are operational metrics; the audit trail is authoritative as evidence of individual changes.
How do we end MCP access?
Your administration revokes a person's access in the MCP overview ("Revoke access"): all connections end immediately, and the revocation is logged. A password change, a reset of multi-factor sign-in and deactivating the account take effect just as immediately. Access tokens are valid for one hour, refresh tokens for 30 days.
Risks and limits
How do you deal with injected instructions (prompt injection)?
Protection rests on the architecture: the model can only call tools within the person's permissions; in the assistant, write actions additionally require confirmation, and read-only mode removes any ability to make changes. In addition, the assistant's system prompt explicitly classifies tool results and documents as data. If an application connected via MCP has its own internet, file or email access, an injected instruction can direct data there; read access and a rule for allowed applications limit this.
Can the AI be used to analyse employee performance data?
WORKSPACE.PM provides no such feature and analyses nothing automatically. The tools are, however, objectively suitable for producing such analyses together with a language model. We therefore assume co-determination applies under Section 87(1) no. 6 BetrVG and recommend ruling out such analyses organisationally. Technically, you can narrow the scope by keeping the permissions for time tracking and user lists tight for AI users.
Is AI-generated content labelled?
During generation it is shown as a suggestion and adopted only after review; in the stored data an adopted suggestion is a normal record. For actions of the assistant the audit trail shows the source. There is no machine-readable labelling under Art. 50(2) of the AI Act; we rely on the exception for internal business applications. If you pass AI content on externally, we recommend labelling it.
Does the AI make automated decisions?
No, none within the meaning of Art. 22 GDPR. A model only acts when a person triggers it, and suggestions are adopted by a human. The only exception to the trigger rule is the project summary: it is generated automatically when the project overview is opened and is purely informational.
How reliable is the generated content?
Language models produce plausible, not necessarily accurate texts. Suggested assessments such as probabilities, amounts or effects are estimates without an empirical basis: a starting point for the professional assessment, not a substitute for it.
Contractual
Does your data processing agreement cover the use of AI?
It covers processing by us. With your own AI provider you conclude your own agreement; our DPA does not cover this transfer, and the AI provider is not our subprocessor. With a local model no third party is involved. If an application connected via MCP sends data to an AI provider, your agreement with that application's vendor applies.
Is there a third-country transfer?
That depends on the provider you choose. With local operation, no. If you choose a provider outside the EU, this is a third-country transfer that you need to safeguard, usually with standard contractual clauses. For Anthropic, OpenAI and Mistral your administration sets the processing region; DeepSeek's interface is operated in China.
Is WORKSPACE.PM a high-risk AI system under the EU AI Act?
In our assessment, no. WORKSPACE.PM is not intended for decisions about employees or for assessing performance and behaviour. If a deployer nevertheless uses the AI for such a purpose, they take on the associated obligations. This classification is not legal advice.
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Status and maintenance
- Version
- 1.0
- As of
- 2026-10-05
- Product version
- WORKSPACE.PM 2.0.10
- Publisher
- AMNAU GmbH, Kronenstraße 13, 30161 Hannover, Germany
- Questions and error reports
- info@amnau.de
We review the documentation with every release; the tool catalogue and system prompts are regenerated from the source code. At least once a year it is reviewed in full. Changes that require a renewed review on your side, such as new AI features or changed defaults, are marked as review-relevant in the change log.
In the SaaS edition a new AI feature is available to everyone with the generativeAi permission immediately after an update; in the self-hosted edition you decide when to update.
Further reading
As of 5 October 2026 · Version 1.0
Information, not legal advice
